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Informal Bargaining Process: An Analysis of the
SEC's Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange
Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door,
loaded, well oiled, cleaned, ready for use but with the hope it
would never have to be used.'
A primary responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission
is to oversee operation of the nation's securities exchanges "for the
protection of investors .... to insure fair dealing in securities ... [and]
to insure fair administration." 2 The Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 established a new regulatory agency, equipped with the surveil-
lance, rulemaking and enforcement tools of the administrative process,
to accomplish these goals.3 Despite recent serious problems in the securi-
ties industry,4 the SEC has not been subjected to blistering attacks as
have other regulatory agencies; 5 but the SEC's reputation should not
obscure faults in the procedure which has evolved for oversight of
securities exchanges. The Exchange Act outlines an administrative
pattern6 to which the traditional concerns of administrative law-rule-
making, fair hearing procedures, articulation of policy, circumscribed
discretion and judicial review-are relevant as a means of controlling
the agency.7 The traditional pattern, however, does not correspond
with the SEC's actual regulation of securities exchanges.
This Note describes the primarily informal, customarily secret, highly
discretionary regulatory pattern which in reality defines the SEC's
relationship with the New York Stock Exchange." A close working re-
1. W. DoucLAs, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (1940).
2. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1964).
3. Great faith in rational planning by experts in administrative agencies was evident
in the early New Deal era, as outlined in Fick, Issues and Accomplishments in Administra.
tive Regulation: Some Political Issues, 26 LAw & COvMNP. PROB. 283, 289-91 (1951). Faith
in the regulatory process -as explicit in relation to the SEC in statements of President
Franklin Roosevelt and the SEC's first chairman Joseph Kennedy, as quoted in R. DE.Bmns,
THE NEv DEAL's SEC: THE FORmTIVE YEAs 20-31, 97 (1964).
4. The most dramatic problems have involved bankruptcies of several major invest-
ment houses. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1970, at 59, col. 7.
5. See, e.g., J. TURNER, THE CHnscAL FEASr (1970) on the Food and Drug Admin-
istration; R. FELLmETH, THE INTaSTATE CommERCE O.mssloN (1970) on the LC.C.; and
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE COMILSSION TO STUDY THE FEDERnAL TRADE
CoMMISSiON (1969).
6. See pp. 813-15 infra.
7. See pp. 812-13 infra.
8. The Note concentrates exclusively on regulation of one security exchange, the New
York Stock Exchange. The Big Board transacts more than 70 per cent of the dollar value
of all stock transactions on United States exchanges. NEw YomR SToc& ExciAGE, FAcr
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lationship, marked by frequent informal contact, has developed be-
tween SEC officials and the Exchange. Most decisions are hammered
out in closed-door bargaining sessions where vast discretion rests with
the agency.9 Recent commentaries ° and judicial decisions" have
focused on the general deficiencies of informal regulatory practices.
This Note describes a particular informal regulatory process as it has
operated over the past ten years. It seeks to evaluate the advantages and
disadvantages of more formal structuring of that process through an-
nouncement of issues under consideration, public hearings on major
issues and articulation of policy.
I. The Informal Bargaining Process
A. Structuring Regulatory Discretion
Administrative agencies are delegated authority by the legislature.
Discretion must accompany the authority because the purpose of the
agency is to perform regulation and oversight which the legislature
feels incapable of accomplishing through more explicit legislation, -"
Statutory authorization for an agency gives some guidance to the
agency, although it may be minimal, in structuring discretion pro-
cedurally and pursuing legislative goals substantively. Professor Ken-
neth C. Davis suggests seven instruments for the "structuring of
BOOK (1970). It has been the pace-setter in organization of operations, setting of commis-
sion rates and establishment of self-regulatory rules. The Exchange's rules are important
not only because they have been copied, but because many New York members are algo
members of other exchanges and the Big Board claims responsibility for member conduct
in any line of business. SEC, SPEcIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARIETs pt. 2, at 706, pt. 4, at
504 (1963) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
9. A number of SEC officials, private practitioners, securities industry members atd
journalists were interviewed in connection with this Note. As all the interviews were
understood to be for background only, it is impossible to cite statements front thoe
interviewed as documentation of specific findings. However, all of those Interviewed con-
firmed the general description here that the SEC and Exchange have a close working
relationship characterized by informal bargaining on regulatory issues. Unfortunately,
negotiators for the New York Stock Exchange refused to speak with the author of this
Note.
10. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DIScRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969),
11. To prevent the public from being "fenced out of its role in rate-making," the
D.C. Circuit last summer ordered the Civil Aeronautics Board to hold public hearings on
airline fares. Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891, 900 (D.C. Cir. 1970). SEC informal regulation of
the exchanges will be scrutinized as the result of the remand in Thill Securities Corp, v.
New York Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970). The Circuit Court reversed the
lower court's finding of an implied antitrust exemption for Exchange price fixing and
remanded because it found "no evidence in the record that the SEC is exercising actual
and adequate review jurisdiction." Thill, supra at 271. The trial court has thus been asked
to survey the appropriateness of the informal bargaining process at the SEC. Judicial
review of informal regulatory processes is discussed further at pp. 839-8,12 infra.
12. See, e.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 33.41 (1965).
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discretionary power" by administrative agencies: "open plans, open
policy statements, open rules, open findings, open reasons, open
precedents" and fair non-judicial procedure.13 Open plans, policy state-
ments and rules "close the gap between what the agency and its staff
know about the agency's law and policy and what an outsider can
know."" They force an agency to articulate clearly its decisions, both
long and short range, and expose them to public scrutiny. Open findings
and reasons force an agency to base decisions on a public record, pre-
venting careless, uninformed or hasty decisions and leading to candid
correlation of findings to agency plans, policies and rules. 15 Open
precedents force the agency to strive for consistency, preventing the
injustice of random policies.16 Fair non-judicial procedures operate
against arbitrary use of discretion by allowing affected parties to know
what is being considered and to respond before a decision is made.
Fair procedures include keeping all views expressed to the agency open
for public inspection and allowing all interested parties to have the
opportunity to express views. 17 "Informal regulation," as discussed
here, makes minimal use of these seven instruments. By contrast in-
creased use of the seven instruments will throughout this Note be
considered "formalization" of the regulatory pattern.'
B. The SEC's Statuto2y Framework
Explicit in the Exchange Act is a two-level regulatory pattern. The
agency regulates securities markets directly in some areas of their
13. K. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 98. Davis' criteria emphasize openness: "Openness is the
natural enemy of arbitrariness and a natural ally in the fight against injustice."
14. Id. at 102.
15. Id. at 103-06. Davis emphasizes that, although findings are traditionally thought of
as the result only of hearings and court proceedings, their value is equally important in
more informal information gathering.
16. Although precedents cannot be binding in a judicial sense if flexible regulation is
to be possible, they should still set some guidelines for agency action. Davis categorizes
their use with the spectrum: "precedents are (I) almost always binding, (2) almays con.
sidered and usually binding, (3) usually considered but seldom binding, (4) occasionall)
considered but never binding, and (5) almost never considered." Id. at 105.
17. Id. at 116-20.
18. Use of "formal" in the administrative context raises for many the foreboding
specter of judicial-type, highly structured hearings, with judges shielded from ex parte
contact with the parties- but to use the word thus is a mistake. There is a spectrum of
decision-making processes, completely unstructured with almost no formality at one end
and very structured with much formality at the other. Discussion of formalizing SEC
procedures here is meant to refer to shifts on that spectrum toward more structuring.
without suggesting shifts be made all the way to judicialized proceedings. The purpose of
examining weaknesses in informal procedures is not to discover how "to maximize the
use of the seven methods of structuring but to locate the optimum degree of structuring in
each respect for each discretionary power." K. DAVIS, supra note 10, at 99 (emphasis in
original deleted).
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activity; it also oversees exchange self-regulation.10 Congress felt in 1934
that it would be impractical for a government body to perform the
sensitive, day-to-day, detailed supervision of the fast-moving securities
industry, and that there existed in this industry unethical, as well as
illegal, activities which could best be curbed through self-regulation.20
But, because self-regulators have a natural tendency to protect and
favor their own interests, often to the detriment of the public,2 1
Congress placed on the SEC the obligation of overseeing self-regula-
tion.22 As chairman of the SEC in the late 1930's, Justice Douglas
described the two-level regulatory pattern with his gun-behind-the-door
metaphor. Describing the process as "something more than coopera.
tion," Douglas hoped that it "would be unnecessary for the Government
to interfere" with self-regulation; but emphasized that hopes did not
relieve the SEC from doing "the job which is ours under the law."'
The SEC's "job under the law" is of three major types:
(1) Under Section 6, the exchanges are required to file registration
statements with data on their "organization, rules of procedure, and
membership ... and 'rules of the exchange.' "24 Before granting regis-
tration, the SEC must find exchange rules "just and adequate to insure
fair dealing and to protect investors. '25 If an exchange has violated the
securities laws, or has failed to enforce member compliance with the
SEC's or its rules, the Commission can under Section 19(a) expel or sus-
pend an exchange officer or suspend or withdraw an exchange's regis-
tration.26
(2) The SEC has direct authority under Sections 10 and 11 as it deems
''necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors" to prescribe rules for exchange specialists, odd lot dealers and
19. See pp. 814-815 infra.
20. The rationale for self-regulation was explained by John Dickinson, chairman of
the Roper Committee which drafted the Exchange Act, at Hearings on H.R. 7852 arid
H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Con., 2d
Sess. 513-15 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Act Hearings]. A similar rationale for
self-regulation was expressed more recently by a former SEC chairman, W. CARY, 'OtlTICS
AND THE REGULATORY AGEN cIS 43-44 (1967).
21. Dickinson testimony, Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 20, at 514, There remains
a need for oversight of profit-seeking self-regulators. See Cary, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244 (1963).
22. See p. 815 infra.
23. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 1, at 82-83. The second SEC chairman, James Landis,
expressed similar sentiments: "The SEC has to be both crackdown and cooperating agency,
depending on the circumstances," quoted in R. DEBaTs, supra note 3, at 110.
24. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 6(a)(2) and 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(a)(2) and
78(a)(3) (1964).
25. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1964).
26. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 19(a)(1) and 19(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(a)(1)
and 78s(a)(3) (1964).
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floor traders27 and short sales, stop-loss orders and manipulative or
deceptive devices. 28 This direct rulemaking authority supercedes ex-
change self-regulation.
(5) The SEC can under Section 19(b) "alter or supplement" an
exchange's rules, if, after appropriate request, the exchange does not
make needed changes on its own.29 This authority, granted for "the
protection of investors,... to insure fair dealing ... [and] to insure
fair administration," 30 extends to thirteen areas of exchange operations,
from trading hours, to financial responsibilities of members, to reason-
able commission rates.31
There has been minimal formal use of the Exchange Act's Section 11
rulemaking and Sections 19(a) and 19(b) oversight powers,32 and thus
minimal judicial scrutiny of required procedures. But Section 11 seems
to contemplate some "formalization" of procedures in its rulemaking
authority. Because the Section applies to all exchanges and has a "public
interest" statutory guideline, it seems to require "notice of proposed
rulemaking" and "opportunity to participate in the rulemaking
through submission of written data, views or arguments" as later
codified by the Administrative Procedure Act.33 Sections 19(a) and 19(b)
speak specifically of "appropriate notice and opportunity for hear-
27. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1964).
28. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1954).
29. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b). 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1954).
30. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1954).
31. This oversight extends to "such matters as (1) safeguards in respect of the financial
responsibility of members and adequate provision against the evasion of financial re-
sponsibility through the use of corporate forms or special partnerships; (2) the limitation
or prohibition of the registration or trading in any security within a specified period after
the issuance or primary distribution thereof; (3) the listing or striking from listing of any
security; (4) hours of trading; (5) the manner, method, and place of soliciting business; (6)
fictitious or numbered accounts; (7) the time and method of making settlements; (8) the
reporting of transactions on the exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with the
consent of the exchange, including the method of reporting short sales, stopped sales, sales
of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receivership, and sales invohing other
special circumstances; (9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commission, interest, listing, and
other charges; (10) minimum units of trading; (11) odd-lot purchases and sales; (12) mini-
mum deposits on margin accounts; and (13) similar matters." Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
32. Only once has the SEC suspended or withdrawn an exchange's registration under
Section 19(a). That was in connection with a small exchange dealing in speculative mining
stocks, whose officials repeatedly violated the Exchange Act and tie Securities Act of 1933.
Securities Exchange Act Releases Nos. 6865 (July 30, 1962) and 7870 (April 22, 1966). aff'd.
San Francisco Mining Exchange v. SEC, 378 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1967). The SEC's non-use of
Section 19(a)(3) authority to suspend or expel securities exchange officials is dicussed in
L. Loss, SEcurris REGLAT ION 1173 (2d ed. 1961), 3136 (Supp. 1969). Non-use of these
sanctions may be accounted for by their drastic nature; as the SpEcta Sro, supra note 8,
pt. 4, at 698, puts it, "the 'big stick' provided here may be too big."
Only twice has the SEC promulgated rules under Section 11. See pp. 819.821 infra. And
only twice has the SEC formally used its Section 19(b) authority; on only one of those
occasions did it go through a full 19(b) proceeding. See p. 824 infra.
33. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (1964).
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ing."34 Although 19(b) talks of notice and hearing only after an
exchange turns down SEC suggestions for rule changes, "elementary
fairness" may require the opportunity for other interested parties to be
involved in the decision-making process even when an exchange com-
plies with SEC requests voluntarily.3,
C. Bargaining Environment of the Sixties
The SEC has been actively involved in overseeing several New York
Stock Exchange practices during the past decade. A close relationship
between Exchange officials and SEC commissioners and staff memberso0
has been used to bargain compromise solutions. There have been pri.
vate meetings at SEC headquarters in Washington and at industry
conventions,37 daily telephone calls and communication at social
gatherings.38
During the 1950's there was little SEC intervention in New York
Stock Exchange practices. 39 Although the Exchange Act had given the
SEC broad authority, it had not been used, either formally or in-
formally.40 Two factors in the bargaining environment explain much
34. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 19(a) and 19(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(a) and
78s(b) (1964). Noting that there may be no answers until the Exchange challenges tie SEC
in court, former SEC director of Trading and Exchanges Philip Loomis listed some
questions left open by the statutory language of Section 19(b) in Loomis, The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEo. WASH. L. Rtv. 214,
223 (1959): "Is the power substantially limited to the twelve enumerated areas, or do the
references to 'such matters as' and 'similar matters' give the Commission a substantially
unrestricted jurisdiction? The statute seems to contemplate that the Commission shall
formulate its proposed changes in rules before the hearings, rather than, as would seem
more logical, after the evidence is in. How specific must the 'specified changes' be? Are the
issues at the hearing limited to the desirability of adopting the specified changes proposed
by the Commission, or do they include the desirability of any changes in the area In
question? Can the Commission, after hearing the evidence, require the adoption of rules
substantially different from those originally proposed? Does an exchange have power tinder
Section 6(c) to modify rules imposed by the Commission under Section 19(b), and does
this depend upon whether the Commission alters the rules by regulation or by order?"
Perhaps, even more fundamental is the unanswered question, must the Commission hold a
hearing as part of a 19(b) proceeding. Loomis seems to assume so here, but in the second
use of 19(b) in 1964, none was held. See p. 824 infra.
35. See pp. 839-841 infra.
36. SEC oversight of Exchanges is handled at the staff level by the Division of Trading
and Markets (before 1963 called Division of Trading and Exchanges).
37. The SEC chairman annually addresses the Florida get-together of the Investment
Bankers Association. L. KOHLMEIER, Tn RrGuLATORS 70 (1969).
38. When he was chairman of the SEC in the early 1960's, however, Wllam Cary
refused to attend industry cocktail parties in Washington. Id.
39. Taking over as SEC Chairman in 1961, William Cary found, "The SEC has rather
broad and general powers which it had not adequately exercised." W. CAR', supra note
20, at 69. Commenting on the SEC's failure to use its 19(b) authority, Sidney Robbins,
chief economist of the Special Study, concurred: "[A]t least during the period intervening
between the early years after its inception and those of the Special Study, the Commission
does not appear to have been a formidable overseer of its self-regulatory responsibilities."
S. ROBBINS, THE SECURMiTES MaKETs, OPEPAxrONS AND ISSUrS 118 (1966).
40. The informal regulatory process to be described here as it operated in the 1960's lt
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of the SEC's new activism in the 1960's: the "scandal syndrome" and
the antitrust threat. The securities industry is prone to periodic scan-
dals;41 scandals have given impetus for more vigilant government regu-
lation throughout the past 40 years. 42 Speculative fever and market
collapses on the American Exchange in 1959 3 awoke the SEC from its
lethargic regulation of the 1950's44 and precipitated Congressional
authorization for the SEC's Special Study of Securities Markets. 4" Reac-
tion to the scandals created pressure for the SEC to intervene actively
to reform exchange practices. 4 Even without scandals the SEC probably
would have been pushed into more vigilant regulation by the threat of
antitrust suits against the Exchange. Since 1963 when the Supreme Court
in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange declared antitrust exemption is
to be implied for anticompetitive Exchange practices "only to the
similar to that used by SEC officials in the 1950's, as described by a former SEC Commis-
sioner, A. Orrick, Organization, Procedures and Practices of the SEC, 28 GEO. WAsH. L
Ray. 50, 72 (1959); but the aggressiveness of the SEC within that process in the 1950's was
much reduced.
41. Fraudulent manipulation followed by drastic drops in the market, great lo.ses due
to negligence in fiduciary responsibilities to investors, and revelations of insider finagling
are common causes of scandals on Wall Street.
42. Scandals following the boom period of the 1920's provided impetus for passage
of the Exchange Act in 1934. R. DEBEDTs, supra note 3, at 12, 18, 21 and 28. In the late
1930's the SEC forced major changes in internal governance at the New York Exchange
with the help of revelation of criminal activities by former Exchange President Richard
Whitney. 2 L. Loss, SEcuirui REGULAT ioN 1181 (2d ed. 1961). Reviewing the history of
government regulation of securities markets, DeBedts concludes, "Only one thing remains
in common in several centuries of legislative efforts to regulate the exploiter of the
investor. Inevitably such attempts come about only when the disastrous results are seen
in retrospect." Supra, at I.
43. For a full description of the Amex scandal, see the SEC staff report, reprinted in
SPECIAL SrUDY, supra note 8, pt. 4, at 755-806.
44. The shock of the revelation of improprieties at the American Exchange anti the
great change thus caused in the political environment at the SEC is shown in the sharp
contrast between former SEC Director of Trading and Exchanges Loomis' comment in
1959 that, since the Whitney scandal, "the significant exchanges have developed a high
sense of public responsibility and a strong desire to operate in a manner which merits the
confidence of the public," Loomis, supra note 34, at 223; and the SEC staff's conclusion in
1963: "The picture at the American Stock Exchange prior to January 1962 was a complete
distortion of the self-regulatory system embodied in the Exchange Act," SPrEtUL STLDV,
supra note 8, pt. 2, at 583.
45. N.Y. Times, May 6, 1962, § 3, at 1, col. 5; and N.Y. Times, June 28, 1961, at 51, col.
S. Former SEC Chairman Cary lists as events leading to the Special Study tie turbulent
market, prevalence of hot issues, extravagant price-earnings ratios, high rates of "fails" to
deliver of stock certificates, criminal references to the Justice Department at an all-time
high, and, "most dramatic," the investigation of the American Exchange. W. C sn,
supra note 20, at 71. Coming out of the Special Study have been the 1964 amendments to
the Securities Act and to the Exchange Act, a basis for improved selling practices, qualifi-
cation standards for broker-dealers not members of registered associations, new rules for
specialists and floor traders, and more and better quotations for the over-the-counter
market. IV. CARY, supra note 20, at 75-76.
46. The cycle of intense regulatory activity followed by periods of quiescence is deemed
a "political fact" in Fick, supra note 3, at 299. After the scandal is over, "there is a newly
evolved status quo .... Under normal condtions ... private management is inevitably the
dominant organizing force." Jaffe, The Limits of the Administrative Process: A Reevalua-
tion, 67 HARV. L. Rrv. 1105, 1109 (1954).
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extent necessary to protect the achievements of the Exchange Act,"41
the SEC and Exchange have realized absence of SEC surveillance and
approval of Exchange anticompetitive practices48 will leave the Ex-
change open to possible convictions for antitrust violations.40
The three SEC/NYSE disagreements described below were all precipi-
tated by either the scandal syndrome or the antitrust threat.50 Im-
petus for vigilant SEC oversight came largely from interested parties
other than the SEC and the Exchange; public and Congressional
indignation after scandals and litigation threats from the Justice De-
partment and non-members of the Exchange emphasized dissatisfaction
with existing Exchange practices. However, resolution of issues was
made predominantly without the involvement of these interested
parties. The SEC and Exchange were pushed to the bargaining table by
outside forces, but other interested parties were then deprived of access
to the decision-making process.
D. The Informal Bargaining Process in Action
Three SEC/NYSE disagreements over the past decade have been
chosen to demonstrate the workings of the informal bargaining process.
The descriptions provide a background for evaluating whether it would
be desirable to formalize the regulatory pattern through use of any of
the seven instruments for structuring discretion.
Description of the chronology and of the forces shaping resolution of
47. 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) rehearing denied 375 U.S. 870 (1963). Silver, a non-member
of the Exchange, sued after his wire connection had been cut off, charging antitrust
violations by the Exchange in boycotting him. In an attempt to reconcile the antitrust
laws with the Exchange Act, Justice Goldberg found there might be justification for
Exchange regulation of ticker service to non-members, but held the Exchange's act of
cutting off Silver's service without notice or hearing was unjustified and served no purpose
of the Exchange Act. The Justice read due process procedures into the Exchange Act, but
did not strike down any Exchange anticompetitive practices; no other court has yet to
strike down an Exchange practice under the antitrust laws.
48. Among Exchange practices which would violate antitrust principles were It not
for the possibility of an implied exemption because of SEC oversight are collective setting
of commission rates, restrictions on with whom members can trade, and limitations on the
number of, and character requirements for, members of the Exchange. 5 L. loss, SrcusssTrI
REGULATION 3156 (Supp. 1969).
49. The Exchange Act grants exemption from antitrust lefislation to the over-the.
counter market organization, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Securities and
Exchange Act of 1943 § 15A(n), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(n) (1964). Without such an explicit cx.
emption, the securities exchanges must rely on implied exemption. See Thrill Securities
Corp. v. New York Stock Exchange, 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1970); Eisen v. Carlisle and
Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968); Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.
1967) cert. denied, 389 U.S. 912 (1968); Klebanow v. Funston, 35 F.R.D. 518 (1964).
50. The floor trading dispute grew out of the agenda of issues spelled out In the
SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 213-25. Revision of off-floor trading rules was sparked
by threat of an antitrust suit. See p. 822 infra. The commission rate structure review




these issues will demonstrate the lack of openness to public scrutiny
and of policy articulation. Often the SEC has suggested changes to the
Exchange, the Exchange has agreed, and there has been no public
announcement.51 On other issues, public announcements have been
made only after the SEC and Exchange have bargained out differ-
ences alone.52 When changes in Exchange practices have been an-
nounced, there has often been no articulation of policies, reasons and
findings.
Description of the informal bargaining process will emphasize that,
rather than describing a desired modus operandi for the SEC, the
statutory provisions are merely being used as an arsenal of weapons
through which the SEC has bargaining leverage at the informal level.
Section 11 rule-making authority has been used not as a procedure for
the SEC to find the best regulations for floor trading but as a bar-
gaining threat, and then, as a formal means of announcing a close-door
bargaining outcome.53 Section 19(b) authority is not a procedure which
the SEC has used to update and reform Exchange rules after notice and
hearings, but a threat which the SEC brandishes to push Exchange
reform, or a formal announcement procedure which is used by the Ex-
change to shift pressure from itself to the SEC by making it appear that
the SEC is forcing Exchange reform.r4
(1) Floor Trading
The SEC's first and only use of its Section l1(a)(1) authority to pre-
scribe rules for exchange floor traders was in 1964.r Floor traders are
Exchange members who trade for their own accounts while personally
present on the Exchange floor. They have advantages over other inves-
tors because of on-the-spot contact with trading" , and can cause manipu-
lated market fluctuations.57 The potentially harmful effect of these
market insiders on fair and honest markets was recognized as early as
1934 when the original draft of the Exchange Act prohibited floor
trading.58 The prohibition was rejected by Congress in favor of Com-
mission authority to regulate, or, if necessary, abolish, floor trading.50
51. See p. 831 infra.
52. See pp. 820, 823-24 infra.
53. See text accompanying notes 55-69 infra.
54. See pp. 822-825 ira.
55. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964).
56. Id. at 4-6. SpEc L STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 208-13.
57. Sp]ciA STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 213-25.
58. S. 2693 and H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) § 10.
59. Statutory prohibition of floor trading was replaced by Section 11(a) authority for
SEC rule-making because, according to Congressman Lea, Congress -%as unsure, in light oE its
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Although the SEC conducted no less than 15 studies of floor trading
abuses,60 not until 1964 did it adopt any rules to protect investors. The
Special Study's condemnation of floor trading brought the issue to the
fore again in the early 1960's.61 Beginning in the summer of 1963, SEC
and Exchange officials held private negotiations on altering floor trad-
ing rules. Not until the SEC broke off the meetings in March 1964 were
the public and other members of the investment community apprised
of the nature of the SEC/NYSE dispute.62 Public hearings and an
opportunity for involvement of other interested parties in the regula-
tory process appeared imminent; 3 but through "purely private and
personal negotiations," the SEC and Exchange reached a compromise,
which allowed some floor trading to continue." Only after announce.
ment of the compromise was public comment solicited.05 Two months
inexperience in securities regulation, of the ramifications of floor trading; and because
"where we gave the Commission the power, it would be a flexible power. If the Coin-
mission finds a mistake has been made, it can readily change its rules to more favorable ones
and thus accomplish the purpose of Congress." 78 CONG. REc. 7862 (1934).
60. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964) at 4-6. In 1935 the
Commission suggested that the exchanges adopt rules governing floor trading. Nothing vag
done, and in 1936 the Commission suggested the segregation of floor trading from floor
brokerage functions; but, again, the suggestions were not carried into effect. Another
major evaluation in 1945 found exchange regulation of floor trading inadequate, and the
Commission tentatively determined to abolish floor trading. But "after considering the matter
and holding conferences -with the Exchange," nothing was done by the agency after "repeatedl
assurances" of self-regulation. Id. at 7. In the 1945 negotiations the SEC was discouraged
from abolishing floor trading through the "covert" intervention of President Truman. L.
KOHLMEIER, supra note 37, at 41. As a result of the 1945 negotiations, the Exchange was
given time to develop adequate rules on floor trading, but the rules adopted as a means of
curbing abuses were steadily eroded. SpEciAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 233-37. As the
SEC concluded in announcing Rule 1la-1, "there has been no time in the past thirty
years when the Commission, which has the statutory responsibility, has been in a position
to make a finding that exchange regulation has satisfactorily solved the problems of floor
trading." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964) at 9.
61. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 241-42. Following the Study, a letter of July
23, 1963 from the SEC to Congress promised a proposal abolishing floor trading would be
developed "[iln light of the very serious and basic problems" to be solved "unless those
exchanges demonstrate that its continuance would be consistent with the public interest."
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964) at 9.
62. N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1963, at 23, col. 4, noted that the SEC regular staff was taking
a much more cooperative attitude on seeking a compromise with the Exchange than had
the Special Study staff; and N.Y. Times, March 16, 1964, at 47, col. 8.
63. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1964, at 47, col. 6 and March 17, 1964, at 45, col. 5.
64. N.Y. Times, June 8, 1964, at 41, col. 2. Only two weeks before announcement of the
compromise solution, Exchange President Funston followed up a visit to President
Johnson with a private discussion with SEC Chairman Cary. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1964,
at 49, col. 2. Although floor trading was a topic of the Funston-Cary discussion, the former
SEC chairman claims it was not even mentioned at the White House. W. CARY, Supra note
20, at 17-18.
65. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7290 (April 9, 1964) at 14. Rule lla-I d(
not prohibit floor trading. It limited such trading to certain special circumstances or
transactions in conformance with an exchange plan "designed to eliminate floor trading
activities which are not beneficial to the market." The simultaneously announccd New
York Stock Exchange plan set up a category of floor traders known as registered traders,
who must meet minimum capital requirements $250,000 above their capital required for
other trading, who are prohibited from floor trading and trading for brokerage activities
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later, without discussion of any comments received by the SEC, new
SEC and Exchange rules were adopted.00
Although the public interest in a fair and honest market may have
been the guiding principle for SEC officials seeking floor trading
changes, three political factors provided bargaining leverage for the
agency. The Exchange did not want public hearings on floor trader
abuses; it had received black eyes in previous hearings and was willing
to give in to avoid repetition. 7 Secondly, many Exchange members did
no floor trading themselves and exerted pressure to dispense with the
embarrassing issue as quietly and expeditiously as possible. s And
third, the SEC's "trump card" was played with its disclosure that the
number two man on a private study done for the Exchange had resigned
after his finding, that floor trading did "irreparable harm" to the auc-
tion market, was suppressed by the Big Board.c9
in the same security on the same day, who must yield to trades from off-floor, and who
must make stabilizing trades 75 per cent of the time. Id. The compromise involved in this
rule is evident; the Exchange originally wanted only a 60 per cent stabilizing requirement,
the SEC wanted 85 per cent. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1964, at 47, col. 6.
66. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 73S0 (June 2, 1964). For a similar study of
SEC inaction over many years, followed by a flurry of concern after the Special Study found
abuses, see the description of the promulgation of SEC Rule llb-l dealing with specialists,
in H. Bartell and R. Robinson, Uneasy Partnership, SEC/NISE, 43 HARv. Bus. Rav. 76,
81-83 (1965) and N. WolfEson and T. Russo, The Stod Exchange Spccialist, An Economic
and Legal Analysis, 1970 DurE L.J. 707. From 1937, when tie SEC developed its Saperstein
Interpretation to guide the Exchange in self-regulating specialists, until the 1962 Amex
report, the Commission made no formal pronouncements on specialists, N. Wolfson, supra
at 721. The Special Study, after a finding of need for a "number of important, specific
improvements in specialist practices and in regulatory concepts and methods," called for
SEC action under Section 11(b). SPECIAL STUDY supra note 8, pt. 2, at 167-71. The SEC
promulgated a rule after private negotiations with the New York and American exchanges.
N. Wolfson, supra at 724-25. The inaction of the SEC over '25 )-ears came despite existence
of 11(b) authority and H.R. RE'. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1934), accompanying
the Exchange Act, which said: "Inasmuch as the stock exchanges objected to the laying
down of any statutory rule governing specialists, their suggestion has been adopted of
giving the Commission effective power to control the activities of specialists and to
experiment with various devices of control."
67. N.Y. Times, April 9, 1964, at 41, col. 7. See also IV. CARY, supra note 20, at 45.
68. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1964, at 53, col 6; April 6, 1964, at 45, col. 2; and April 9,
1964, at 1, col. 1. In 1964 at the time of the rule change, 400 members of the Exchange
floor traded; only 35 of these made floor trading a primary activity. Floor trading ac-
counted for only 2.1 per cent of Exchange volume. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7290 (April 9, 1964) at 1.
The SEC was aware of divisions at the Big Board. Concerned with the disproportionate
voice of floor professionals, who had 10 per cent of the business and 60 per cent of the
seats on the Exchange Board of Governors, the SEC hoped to use the floor trading issue
to "foment an internal revolt" against any remaining "private club" vestiges at the
Exchange. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1964, at 45, col. 2. See also H. Crossland and R. Sehr, The
Gods of the Marketplace: An Examination of the Regulation of the Securities Business,
48 B.U. L. REv. 515, 548-50 (1968).
Use by the SEC of dissidents within the Exchange to help reform the institution is an
old technique. See D.BErS, supra note 3, at 145-52, on Chairman Landis' "cultivation" of
Exchange liberal members during the mid-1930's to challenge the governance structure of
the Big Board.
69. N.Y. Times, April 6, 1964, at 45, col. 2; and April 12, 1964, § 3, at 1, col. 1.
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(2) Off-Floor Trading
The SEC used its Section 19(b) power to alter an Exchange rule for
only the second time in its history in 196670 to change off-floor trading
practices. Exchange Rule 394 limited severely the right of members to
execute trades for customers with non-member market-makers, even if a
better execution could be made off of the Exchange floor.7 1 This limi-
tation on trading was questioned severely by the Special Study72 and
was open to attack as an antitrust violation. By restricting those with
whom members could deal, the rule established a group boycottY' M.
A. Schapiro, a New York Exchange non-member, threatened antitrust
action unless the SEC rescinded or modified Rule 394,74 In response to
Schapiro's request for 19(b) action, the Commission prepared a staff
study on off-floor trading. Secret testimony was taken from Exchange
members and representatives of regional exchanges and third market
firms.75 The study condemned Rule 394 for thwarting purposes of the
Exchange Act and recommended loosening of Exchange rules to allow
more off-floor trading.7 6
70. See p. 824 infra for a discussion of the first use of Section 19(b).
71. SEC STAFF STUDY, IN THE MATTER OF RULES, REGULATIONS AND PRArIces RELATING
TO OFF-BOARD TRADING, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1965) [hereinafter cited as
STAFF STUDY ON OFF-BOARD TRADING]. The Study found, "[S]ubsequent interpretations of
... Rule 394, filed originally with the Commission [in] 1957, have progressively prevented
member firms from executing agency offers off of the floor of the Exchange or from engag,
ing in any trade off the Exchange for their own account .... [T]here seems little question
but that executions in the third market, particularly on block trades, would in many
circumstances result in better dollar price for the institutional investor." Id. at 1-2.
72. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 242-46. The interference of Rule 394 with
customers receiving the best possible execution from their broker conflicted with the SEC
policy announced in Edison Electric Illuminating Co. of Boston, I SEC 909, 913 (1936)
that a "well-governed exchange recognizes limits to its operations as an automatic auction
market and should ... recognize and enforce the duty of a broker to get the best price for
his client, even though that price is only obtainable off of the floor of the exchange." The
interference also conflicts with the SEC action in its first 19(b) proceeding, The Rules of
the New York Stock Exchange, 10 SEC 270 (1941), where the SEC ordered the Big Boad
to eliminate rules preventing members from trading on regional exchanges in stocks also
listed on the New York Exchange.
73. See Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941), Radiant
Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway.
Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
74. Schapiro presented to the Commission a copy of the antitrust complaint, which lie had
planned to file in 1965 when he was pushing the SEC to take action on off-floor trading
rules, during the 1968 SEC hearings on the Exchange commission rate structure. Official
Transcript of Proceedings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission Rate Structure
Investigation, testimony of M.A. Schapiro 3924-25 and Schapiro Exhibit 2 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as SEC Rate Structure Investigation]. Schapiro, as a non-member of the Exchange
and as a third market dealer in bank stocks, was concerned by the 1965 listing of Chase
Manhattan common stock on the New York Exchange. That listing, he feared, would
interfere with his dealings with New York members who would be prohibited from trading
in Chase stock with him by Rule 394. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7954 (Sept. 16,
1966) at 12, refers to Schapiro's request for 19(b) action on Rule 394 without naming him,
75. Id. at 2.
76. STAFF STUDY ON OFF-BOARD TRADING, supra note 71, at 3-5, found Rule 394 "was
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Despite the outside interest of Schapiro, and the major importance to
many non-members of the New York Exchange, resolution of changes
in Rule 394 was made in a series of private negotiations between the
SEC and Exchange. 77 Only the Exchange was given a copy of the Con-
clusions and Recommendations of the Staff Report.78 They were not
shown to any of the persons who had testified during their preparation,
other than Exchange offidals. 9 Neither the body of the staff report nor
the testimony taken in its preparation have ever been made public.80
geared to the economic interests of Exchange members," and "in many cams ... thwarted
rather than furthered the purposes of the Exchange Act."
77. Some portion of the private negotiations between the SEC and the Exchange can be
pieced together through a series of fifteen letters-eight from the SEC to the Exchange
and seven from the Exchange to the SEC-dated from Nov. 29, 1965, to Oct. 3. 1987. The
letters were turned over to Schapiro on Aug. 5, 1968 after his request for them and for the
Staff Study on Off-Board Trading. The letters [hereinafter cited as SEC/NYSE Rule 394
Correspondence] are contained in Appendix H of Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's
Memorandum in Opposition, MA. Schapiro and Co. v. SEC, Civil No. 22.1370 (D. D.C.,
filed Sept. 25, 1970) (See note 88 infta).
The letters provide insight into the familiarity of the SEC/NYSE relationship. Exchange
President Funston's letter of Nov. 29, 1965 to SEC Chairman Cohen says, the "ball rests
with you" in relation to resolution of the Rule 394 issue. Cohen's letter of Dec. 22. 1965
mentions the "fruitful discussions" between staffs of the SEC and Exchange. The Nov. 29,
1965 Funston to Cohen letter emphasizes the personal nature of the relationship: "As you
know I am going into the hospital today for ten days . . . . I regret that I have to be
away at this time but I guess one can't pick and choose when one goes to the hospital."
Cohen's letter of Dec. 22, 1965 to Funston summarizes the essence of the bargaining
process: "As you know, these matters have been considered by the Exchange and the
Commission for many months and though we expect ultimate implementation may require
communication with other self-regulatory institutions and other affected parties, we hope
that these matters can be moved forward to their resolution within a reasonably short
period of time." (Emphasis added.)
78. SEC/NYSE Rule 394 Correspondence, supra note 77, letter from Cohen to Funston
of Dec. 22, 1965. After the Exchange received the Staff Study Conclusions and Recom-
mendations, it submitted to the SEC a suggested rule change which the SEC found inade-
quate, as detailed in Cohen to Funston letter of May 12, 1966. The SEC suggested its own
approach. Drafts of proposed rule changes then went back and forth between SEC and
Exchange, letter of Aug. 15, 1966 from SEC Division of Trading and Markets Amociate
Director Eugene Rotberg to Exchange Vice President Alger Chapman, Jr.
79. The SEC did not make the Staff Study Conclusions and Recommendations public,
except for sending a copy to the Exchange. Schapiro released them to the public after lie
obtained them from the SEC two years later. (See note 74 supra.) Schapiro placed the
Conclusions in the record at the 1968 Rate Investigation hearings. SEC Rate Structure
Investigation, supra note 74, Nov. 7, 1968, Schapiro Exhibit I.
80. Schapiro has sued the SEC under the Freedom of Information Act of 1966, 5
U.S.C. § 552, to produce the full Staff Study on Off-Board Trading and the tranmcripts of
interviews and other documents the SEC staff used in preparation of the Studv. M.A.
Schapiro and Co., Inc. v. SEC, Civil No. 2243-70 (D. D.C., filed July 29, 1970). The SEC
has refused to turn over the requested report and testimony on grounds that they are
exempted from the Freedom of Information Act as (I) intra-agency memoranda, (2) matters
related to examination, operating or condition reports prepared for use of an agency
responsible for regulation or supervision of a financial institution, and (3) investigatory
files compiled for law enforcement purposes. Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum,
MA. Schapiro and Co. v. SEC supra, filed Oct. 1, 1970.
Release of the entire Staff Study has also been requested by the Justice Department.
REsPoNSE OF THE U.S. DEPr. OF JusricE To SEC Rrz.xsE 8791 (March 20, 1970), at 17. The
SEC denies that the full text of the Staff Study was shown to the New York Stock Exchange
at the time of the SEC/NYSE negotiations in 1965, Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum
supra, at note 7; but see letter of Dec. 22, 1965 from Cohen to Funston, SEC/NYSE Rule
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Only after SEC/NYSE bargaining had reached a compromise were the
new SEC and Exchange rules on off-floor trading revealed to the public,
and comments solicited on them.81 One month later, with no discussion
of the eight comments received by the SEC, the new rules were
adopted.82
SEC approval of the new off-floor trading rules was clothed as a 19(b)
request to the Exchange. 3 There was no need for the formal request,
as the SEC and Exchange had bargained to a compromise before the
request was made. Operationally, the use of a 19(b) request after, rather
than before, resolution of the issue, may have been little different from
the first use of 19(b) in 1940, because the threat of 19(b) authority loomed
in the background throughout SEC/NYSE bargaining. But, proce-
durally, this use of 19(b) was quite different. In 1940 the SEC had first
formally requested a rule change; after the Big Board refused to com-
ply, the Commission held hearings, issued an opinion and ordered the
change.84 In 1966, the Exchange asked the SEC to clothe the change in
off-floor trading rules as a 19(b) request, probably to establish a formal
groundwork for antitrust exemption and to ease the Exchange's rela-
tions with members unhappy with the reform. 5
394 Correspondence, supra note 77: "We understand that you have had a thorough dis.
cussion with our staff of the underlying materials which form the basis for such conclusions
and recommendations" on Rule 394.
81. Securities Exchange Act Release 7954 (Sept. 16, 1966). The proposed Exchange
Rule 394 (b) provided for a member soliciting a non-member market maker for an
off-floor trade if the member had first made a diligent effort to make a satisfactory execu-
tion on the floor and had offered to execute the trade at the same price on the floor
immediately prior to the off-floor execution. Commission Rule 19(b)-l, announced
simultaneously, set requirements for non-member market makers who may be solicited
for off-floor trades.
Although the SEC asked for comments on the proposed rules, there were no public
hearings. The Exchange, fearing the loss of public confidence should hearings be held, was
willing to compromise on the issue to avoid public airing. Loomis, The SEC Has a Little
List, 75 FORTUNE, Jan. 1967, at 111, 113.
82. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7981 (Oct. 20, 1966). The eight comments the
SEC received in reply to Release No. 7954, supra note 81, included one from Schapiro,
three from other non-member broker-dealers complaining that the proposed changes did
not go far enough in allowing off-floor trading, a plea from the Midwest Stock Exchange
not to apply Rule 19(b)-I to it, and a request from the Philadelphia-Baltimore-Vashington
Exchange to require New York members to check for possible executions on regional
exchanges before trading with third market dealers. Letters on file at the SEC in Wash-
ington.
83. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7981 (Oct. 20, 1966).
84. The SEC action was sparked by the February 1940 Exchange decision to enforce its
constitutional ban on member trading on regional exchanges in stocks also listed on the
New York Exchange, so-called multiple trading. The Commission studied the ban from
April to October before requesting reform from the Exchange, After no compliance, the
Division of Trading and Exchanges prepared a full report for the Commissioners, who
then made the formal 19(b) request. After the Exchange said no, hearings before a trial
examiner, a trial examiner's report, filing of briefs, Commission consideration and an
opinion followed before the SEC ordered the rule change ending the ban on multiple trad.
ing. In the Matter of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 SEC 270, 272-74 (1941).
85. 5 L. Loss, SECURTrrImS REULATIoN 3168-69 (Supp. 1969).
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Despite Exchange President Funston's statement that the Big Board
was a "reluctant partner" in the "sweeping change" in off-floor trad-
ing, 86 new Rule 394(b) has almost no change at all. Procedures for off-
floor trading remain onerous and are little used.87 Despite former SEC
Chairman Cohen's promises,88 the SEC has done little to require the
Exchange to make the new rule achieve its professed purposes.89
(3) The Commission Rate Structure
The SEC is specifically charged with oversight of exchanges' "fixing of
reasonable rates of commission" under Section 19(b). 0 Despite this
responsibility, the New York Stock Exchange was able to raise its com-
mission rates four times between 1934 and 1958 with nary a whisper of
public protest from the SEC.91 In 1959 it seemed a bolt out of the blue
when the SEC announced, after secret bargaining with the Exchange, a
small rollback in the Exchange's 1958 rate increase?2 But when the Ex-
86. N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1966, § 3, at 1, col. 8.
87. Letter from Cohen to Funston of Aug. 23, 1967, SEC/NYSE Rule 394 Correspon-
dence, supra note 77: "We must emphasize that rule 394 was designed to make it possible
for a member to execute off the floor if he could bet a better price. The interpretation
you have given this rule may make it impossible as a practical matter for him to do sO."
According to an Exchange newsletter, from Nov. 7 to Dec. 30, 1966, Rule 39 was used less
than once a day. N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1967, at 52, col. 6. See also Wall St. Journal, Feb. 14.
1967, at 2, col. 3. Use of Rule 394(b) has increased little since. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970,
at 61, col. 5.
88. Cohen told the American Management Association on Nov. 16, 1966, that the SEC
had already made "an important first step" in promoting off-floor trading, and "we
plan to exercise special diligence in this area ...to determine whether the change is
achieving its purpose." Quoted in Rule 394(b) on Probation, BANt STocr QuARTEnL.Y, Dec.
1966, at 2.
89. Despite the minimal use of Rule 394(b), it stands today as amended in 1966 except
for small modifications which reduce the paperwork requirements and grant more Ex-
change floor officials authority to approve going off-floor. Exchange officials admit these
changes did not alter the substance of the rule. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1970, at 61. col. 5.
Exactly why the SEC has not followed through on implementation of 394(b)'s purpo.ses, as
stated when it was adopted, is not dear. The STAFF STUDY ON OFF-BoomlD TRADMG. supra
note 71, at 5-6, lists some advantages of on-board trading, including the listing of all
trades on the ticker tape; but, at that time, the staff concluded, "disadiantages sem to
outweigh the advantages," supra at 6. No contradictory finding has been made by the
Commission since. The informal bargaining process has allowed the SEC to pushl the
Exchange on Rule 394 at some times while lessening the pressure at others without the
necessity for either SEC or Exchange of openly articulating policy bases for such actions.
90. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 19(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(9) (1964).
91. For each rate increase, the Exchange notified the Commission of the proposal before
approval; but only in 1942 did the Commission suggest any alterations in the proposal; the
small alteration was accepted by the Exchange. In each instance the Exchange wms given
private assurance by the SEC that it approved of the new rates. SPEcIA. STUDY, supra
note 8, pt. 2, at 329-33. Except for the 1942 increase, the only data upon which the SEC
had to rely in giving approval was supplied by the Exchange itself. Supra at 342. As a
result of this non-vigilant attitude toward commission rates, "the Commission itself has
never publicly articulated any views as to appropriate standards, except in the most
limited respects," concluded the SPr'ct. STUDY, supra at 333.
92. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 331-32. The Exchange membership had
already approved the increase on April 3 when the SEC announced its inquiry into its
reasonableness. Securities Exchange Act .Release No. 5678 (April 14, 1958). The SEC-forced
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change announced a new rate proposal in 1964, there was immediate
concern with public SEC approval.93 In the six years since the previous
rate proposal, the Silver decision had made the Exchange, an association
of independent businessmen who fixed prices,04 aware of antitrust ex-
posure. 5 With the threat of private 0 or Justice Departmentt 7 suits, the
Exchange welcomed SEC investigation of the reasonableness of the
proposed rate structure to establish a groundwork for antitrust exemp-
tion.
SEC dissatisfaction with profit data 8 used to justify the proposed rate
increases led the Exchange to shelve its 1964 rate proposal 0 By Jan-
uary, 1968 when it made its second proposal, concern had shifted from
member firm profitability to the continued viability of a minimum rate
structure with institutional participation in the Exchange market
increasing.100 Institutions had devised elaborate "give-up" schemes to
circumvent the fixed rate structure's lack of any volume discount as a
means of reducing commission costs.10' Both the SEC and Exchange
rollback only decreased Exchange commissions by 5.3 per cent on trades with commissiong
between $100 and $2400. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5889 (Feb. 20, 1959).
93. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 1964, at 1, col. 2; and N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1965, at 35, Col. 6.
94. Such price fixing had been ruled per se illegal in U.S. v. National Association of
Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (1950); U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
The New York Stock Exchange has, since its founding in 1792, set minimum commission
rates for members to charge non-members for executing trades on the Exchange. All non-
members must pay the same commission, regardless of whether they are broker-dealers or
ordinary investors. The commission rate has been based on a sliding scale determined by
money involved per round lot. The rate covers basic brokerage functions and also may pay
for ancillary services such as research, wire ticker facilities and portfolio management. Un.
til 1968, see p. 829 infra, there was no discount for large transactions; the commission
cost for a trade of 1000 shares was ten times the cost of a trade of 100 shares. SPEcIAL
STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 2, at 294-96.
95. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1964, at 57, col. 6; and Aug. 4, 1965, at 43, col. 4.
96. See the list of antitrust suits filed and threatened in N.Y. Times, Feb. 7, 1965, § 3,
at 1, col. 1.
97. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1963, at 35, col. 8; Feb. 7, 1965, § 3, at 1, col. 1, and Aug. 22,
1965, § 3, at 1, col. 8.
98. N.Y. Times, March 1, 1965, at 37, col. 6.
99. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1965, at 32, col. 3. During the period between Exchange rate
proposals, the SEC helped the Big Board fight antitrust litigation against the fixed rate
structure. The SEC amicus curiae brief in the 7th Circuit's adjudication of Kaplan v.
Lehman Brothers told the court that the SEC was working on proposals for volume dis.
counts and argued for the court not to meddle. N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1966, at 67, col. 7.
100. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968). By 1969, 50 per cent of all
share volume and 60 per cent of all dollar value of trading of the Big Board was done by
institutions. N.Y. Times, April 21, 1970, at 59, col. 6.
101. For detailed descriptions of the circuitous routes whid were used by Lxdange
members to give-up portions of their commissions as directed by institutional traders for
whom the brokers were making transactions, see SEC Rate Structure Investigation, supra
note 74, at 1372-403, 1420-54, 1601-23. The SEC had been concerned with give-up practices
as early as 1966 when SEC Chairman Cohen wrote to all the exchanges and" to the
National Association of Securities Dealers seeking ways of eliminating such practices,
reprinted at 112 CONe. REC. 17,856-57 (1966). Although that letter only asked for sugges.
tions on eliminating give-ups, the threat of SEC 19(b) action "was exposed beneath the velvet
glove.' 5 L. Loss, SECuiuTMS REGuILATION 3177 (Supp. 1969).
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were worried about the drain of trading off of the Exchange necessary
to implement these give-ups without violating Exchange anti-rebate
rules.10 2 "In a step believed to be without precedent," the SEC and
Exchange addressed this concern with alternative proposals for re-
form.103 There had been no lack of private negotiations between SEC
and Big Board officials over revising the commission rate structure, 04
but the end result was not the usual jointly recommended proposal.
Simultaneous with Exchange announcement of its new rate proposal,
the SEC proposed its own Rule lOb-10 to deal with give-ups.1'0 5 The
unprecedented nature of the procedures continued as pressure from the
102. A common give-up procedure would be for a dual member of the New York
Exchange and a regional exchange to execute a trade on the regional, which did not have
such stringent anti-rebate rules, allowing the Big Board member to give-up part of tie
commission to non-member dealers the institution instructed it to compensate. These non-
member dealers often sold shares for the mutual fund making the transaction, and tile
fund used this device as a means of compensating them. SEC Rate Sltructre Inesligalion,
supra note 74, at 475-78, 1231-309; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1958)
at 3-4, noting that regional dollar volume increased from 6.8 per cent of all exchange
volume in 1961 to 8.4 per cent in 1966.
103. N.Y. Times, March 26, 1968, at 59, col. 5.
104. The Exchange was considering institution of a volume discount or an approved
form of commission splitting with non-members as "sweeteners" designed to gain SEC
approval of a new rate structure, and had discussed such ideas with the Commission.
N.Y. Times, July 30, 1965, at 32, col 8; Dec. 2, 1965, at 60, col. 2; and Aug. 5, 1966, at 37,
col. 6. Just before the January 1968 proposal was announced, Exchange President Robert
Haack traveled to Washington to explain the proposal to the SEC. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3,
1968, at 37, col. 4.
105. SEC Release No. 8239, at 7 (Jan. 26, 1968). More than 70 comments were re-
ceived by the SEC on the simultaneously announced Exchange proposal and Rule lOb-10.
More than half of the letters were from New York Stock Exchange members supporting
their organization's proposals and expressing horror at Rule lOb-10. Another ten or so
letters were from mutual funds, strongly endorsing volume discounts; another ten or so
non-members of the New York Exchange, regional members or independent broker-
dealers, said their economic livelihoods would be greatly endangered by elimination of
give-ups. The only "public" comments were from two Princeton University economists,
calling for an end to all fixed commission rates. SEC lOb-10 file VrS7-319-1-2 on file at
the SEC in Washington.
Recognizing that proposed Rule lOb-10 was "not a substitute for full re-examination of the
structure and rates of Commissions on the national securities exchanges," the SEC
supported its proposals by pointing out that "if ... a mutual fund manager has various
means at his disposal to recapture for the benefit of the fund a portion of the commi-sions
paid by the fund, he is under a fiduciary duty to do so." Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968) at 8. Some mutual fund managers had found means to recapture
commissions through mutual fund affiliates registered as broker-dealers and members of
the NASD. Managers could direct give-ups or reciprocal business to these affiliates, as
described supra at 4.
The seriousness of the SEC about adopting Rule lOb-lO may be seen in Wall Street's
xeaction: "The Street thought the proposed rule had the looks of a lever intended to get
the Exchange to move on a volume discount and to accede to the total abolition of
give-ups." Loomis, Big Board, Big Volume, Big Trouble, 77 Fozrruor, May 19o8, at 146, 22-1.
If announcement of proposed Rule lOb-10 was meant as a bargaining lever, it was success.
ful, see p. 830 infra. After the Exchange acceded to institution of a volume discount
and abolition of give-ups, more drastic measures than the proposed SEC rule, the Com-
mission dropped plans to adopt lOb-10.
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Justice Department 0 " and the regional exchanges0 7 led the SEC to
call for public hearings to explore commission rates and related prob-
lems.108
Throughout the summer of 1968, and sporadically since, the SEC has
collected more than 6,000 pages of testimony on the commission rate
structure. 109 The testimony is weighted to reflect traditional SEC/NYSE
bargaining concerns. Much testimony is by New York Stock Exchange
officials.' 10 The SEC's presentation of witnesses is to a large extent
aimed at exposing give-up procedures."' Aside from a scattering of
Wall Street mavericks,"12 it was necessary for the Justice Department to
get involved by presenting several economists to place in the record
fundamental questioning of fixed commission rates.113 Use of private,
106. N.Y. Times, April 2, 1968, at 63, col. 5. The April 1, 1968 release of the CoM-
.ENTs OF THm U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTIc E ON SEC RELEASE No. 8239, calling for negotiated
commission rates on the Exchange, was considered "the worst blow of all" to Exchanve
hopes for maintaining the commission structure. Loomis, Big Board, Big Volume, Big
Trouble, 77 FORTUNE, May 1968, at 146, 221. The Justice Department continued to play
a major role in setting the tone for the commission rate structure dispute with its version
of the evidence presented in the 1968 SEC hearings in JUSTIcE DEPARTMENT, MEMOItANDIt
ON TnE FixED MINIMUM COMMIisSION RATE STRUCTURE (Jan. 17, 1969). That memorandum
found no justification for fixed commission rates to serve any purposes of the Exchange
Act. Opposition to fixed rates was continued through the change in Presidential adminis-
tration in JUsTICE DEPARTMENT, COM1%MENTS ON SEC RELEASE No. 8717 (Nov. 17, 1969) and
JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, RESPONSE TO SEC RELEASE 8791 (March 20, 1970).
107. Midwest Stock Exchange President Michael Tobin denounced the "bilateral
negotiations" between SEC and Exchange, Tobin to SEC letter, March 29, 1968, SEC
lOb-10 file #S7-319-1-2 at the SEC in Washington.
108. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8324 (May 28, 1968).
109. SEC Rate Structure Investigation, supra note 74,
110. SEC Rate Structure Investzgation, supra note 74, at 23-137, 2540.807, 5162.417.
111. SEC Rate Structure Investigation, supra note 74, at 1372-403, 1420.54, 1601.23,
1840-962, 1982-2050. With pointed questioning, the absurd justifications of give-ups were
forced into the record. See the careful case being built up, through staff questioning,
that the amount a broker is willing to give up has no relation to the cost of his execution,
testimony of officials of Pershing & Co., at 144-207; and the case being built against a
commission that covers ancillary services whether or not the customer uses them,
testimony of William Donaldson of Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, at 737-851. In question-
ing officials of Fidelity Management and Research Co., at 1831-962, SEC Associate Director
of the Division of Trading and Markets Eugene Rotberg pushed especially hard to make
the Commission's point. After exposing a lie in Fidelity's testimony (at 1902), Rotberg led
the witnesses through a description of give-ups made to foreign dealers to compensate
them for "information." Rotberg sarcastically asked the question he knew the witness
could not answer: "Would you please tell us what information you thought Boettcher
was getting from Hong Kong... Or Beirut, Lebanon?" at 1914. See similar questioning at
1782-90, 1894-95, 2030-34.
112. SEC Rate Structure Investigation, supra note 74, testimony of M.A. Schapiro,
at 3904-4003, and testimony of Donald Weeden, at 1461-508, 4004-61.
113. Lionel Kestenbaum of the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department opened
the Department's presentation of six witnesses at the SEC hearings: "The Department
believed that the Commission's evidentiary record on this issue would not be complete
without expert analysis and comment on the basic policy question and the Exchange's
economic argument." SEC Rate Structure Investigation, supra note 74, at 3527. To rebut
the Exchange witnesses' arguments that fixed commission rates were necessary to maintain
a strong, central marketplace, the Justice Department presented economists Paul Samuel-
son, at 3530-6222, William Baumol, at 3623-90, Henry Wallich, at 3757-805, and Harold
Demsetz, at 3810-68.
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preliminary hearings allowed SEC officials to prepare their witnesses
and to inform SEC cross-examiners 14 so that the hearings could be used
as an effective publicity device to push support for commission rate re-
form including implementation of a volume discount.' Although the
hearings proved inadequate as a record upon which to base a decision,
as the SEC recognized by continuing private data collection, 11° they
made possible the expression of outside views and forced the Exchange
publicly to defend its position.
Opening the commission rate structure to public scrutiny proved
effective in late summer 1968 when the Exchange announced its inten-
tion to institute a volume discount and abolish give-ups." 7 By letting
the wind out of SEC sails, the Exchange seemed determined through
minor reform to maintain the basic commission structure.28 The 1968
compromise was considered but an "interim solution," and the SEC and
Exchange continued their private negotiations for the next three
years.119 In early 1970, with several major brokerage houses filing for
bankruptcy, 2 0 completely private, secret negotiations between SEC
and Exchange officials led to approval of a surcharge on small trans-
actions less than two weeks after the Exchange requested it.'-" Public
hearings were held before renewal of the original 60-day "emergency
114. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8328 Uune 5, 1968) at 2, setting up procedures
for the hearings, asks persons wishing to testify to file a description of the evidence to be
presented to facilitate scheduling and "if necessary arranging preliminary conferences with
and between interested participants."
115. The SEC was aware of most of the practices about which it presented witnesses
at the hearings; see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968). Pointed
questioning by SEC staff members, see note 111 supra, elicited answers which bolstered
the Commission's criticism of give-ups.
116. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1970, at 47, col. 7.
117. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1968, at 57, col. 8. The cut in commission rates caused by
the proposed volume discount amounted to an estimated $200 million per year. Loomis,
They're Tearing Up Wall Street, 80 FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 1969, at 88, 158.
118. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1968, § 3, at 1, col. 5; and Aug. 9, 1968, at 1, col. 1; 5
L. Loss, SEcutrTiEs REGuLATiON 3182 (Supp. 1969).
While the SEC was publicly pushing the Exchange through the hearings, it =as also
privately pressuring it through threats of 19(b) action unless the Exchange abolished
give-ups and instituted a volume discount or negotiated rates for large trades, as
described in Independent Broker-Dealers' Association v. SEC, Civil No. 22,925 (D.C. Cir.
March 4, 1971), at 7-11.
119. Approval of the Exchange interim plan was given in a Cohen to Haack letter of
Aug. 30, 1968. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8399 (Aug. 30, 1968).
120. See note 4 supra.
121. The approved surcharge of $15 applied to orders of up to 1.000 slares, but was
limited to not more than 50 per cent of the fixed commission. The letter from SEC
Chairman Budge to Haack approving the surcharge included the stipulation: "The
Commission . . . expects the exchanges will take all steps necessary to assure that full
brokerage services to small investors are restored and that transaction size and other
limitations on accounts of such investors which were imposed in the last year by a
substantial portion of exchange membership will be removed." N.Y. Times, April 3, 1970,
at 51, col. 6.
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financial relief,"'122 but it required Congressional pressure to force the
SEC to seek views other than those of the Exchange before granting
the renewal. 23
Not until the Exchange made its fourth rate proposal in July 1970124
did the SEC finally pass judgment on an entire rate revision. In Octo-
ber 1970 the SEC approved major portions of the proposal but called
for substantial reductions in proposed small trade prices and negotiated
rates for large transactions. 125 The SEC and Exchange returned to the
bargaining table to discuss these revisions, 20 but the SEC finally lost
patience and four months later requested large trade negotiated rates.m 7
122. Wall St. Journal, July 14, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
123. Congressman Moss of California, chairman of the House banking subcommlttee,
wrote SEC Chairman Budge in June: "It is my sincere hope that the commission in the
exercise of its responsibilities will act upon the application (for the surcharge extension)
of the exchange only after the commission has held public hearings," Wall St. journal,
June 29, 1970, at 3, col. 2. Budge had earlier stated that no hearings were contemplate(
for the surcharge extension alone. Moss threatened Congressional hearings if the SEC did
not develop a public record. Wall St. Journal, July 3, 1970, at 3, col. 4. The SEC received
more than 3,000 letters complaining about the surcharge. Welles, Can the New York Stock
Exchange Survive? INsrITUTIONAL INVESTOR, June, 1970, at 76.
124. Wall St. Journal, July 1, 1970, at 14, col. 1; June 30, 1970, at 3, col. 1. The July
proposal was preceded by the third proposal in January, based on a study of costs and
profts of member firms done for the Exchange by National Economic Research Associates.
The plan called for cuts of up to 37.5 per cent in commissions on certain large transactions,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1970, at 1, col. 2; Feb. 16, at 53, col. 8.
125. Wall St. Journal, Oct. 26, 1970, at 30, col. 1. The SEC approval came in the form
of a Budge to Haack letter of Oct. 22, 1970. CURRENT CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 77, 919
(1970). The SEC called for rollbacks as great as 25 per cent in the increased rates for 100
to 400 share transactions, and stated that fixed minimum commissions for portions of
stock orders over $100,000 were neither "necessary or appropriate." A preliminary
estimate was that the SEC suggestions would lop off $100 million of the $550 million fi
increased commissions expected from the Exchange proposal.
126. Chairman of the Exchange Board of Governors Bernard Lasker and Vice Chairman
Ralph DeNunzio met with SEC officials. However, Exchange President Haack did not
accompany them. Although Haack claimed other commitments, his disagreement with
many governors of the Exchange over the commission rate structure appeared to be an
equally plausible explanation for his absence. Wall St. Journal, Nov. 23, 1970, at 2, col. 3.
During the previous week, Haack had stunned Wall Street by calling for an end to all
fixed commission rates across the board, although the SEC had asked negotiated rates
only on some large orders in its Oct. 22 letter. Criticizing the SEC for failing to enforce
an end to give-ups and reciprocal means of commission splitting, as had been called for
in the 1968 interim proposal, Haack said such practices continued, forcing many trades
into the third market and onto regional exchanges. He said these practices threatened
the Big Board. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1970, at 1, col. 2; Wall St. Journal, Nov. 18, 1970,
at 3, col. 1. Haack's speech drew criticism from many Exchange members and began
rumors that he would be fired. N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1970, § 3, at 1, col. 2.
127. The request came in a February 10, 1971 letter to Exchange President Haack from
SEC Commissioner Richard Smith. CURRENT CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77, 955 (1971).
Nothing was said in the letter about the earlier objections to proposed rate increases In
the 100 to 400 share range, and a compromise from the October position was involved:
negotiated rates were required only for transactions over $500,000, not $100,000.
Whether the October 1970 letter was an official 19(b) request for an Exchange rule change
poses an interesting question. Section 19(b) authority is never mentioned in the letter, and
it is written in terms of whether the SEC would approve of a future rate change, not
a request for an alteration in the existing rate structure. Yet, the letter clearly had its
source in 19(b)(9) SEC oversight of the setting of a "reasonable rate of commission." The
February, 1971, letter, however, talks of the need for "immediate action to implement"
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SEC treatment of the commission rate issue has been a departure
from informal bargaining practices; throughout the six-year period,
views of both the Exchange and SEC have been public, and views of
other parties have been placed in the public record. There has, however,
still been substantial private negotiation; and the first SEC approval
of the surcharge was accomplished in the traditional informal bar-
gaining fashion. Articulation of the necessity for fixed commission rates
on small trades and negotiated rates on large trades or of a reasonable-
ness standard is noticeably lacking in SEC approval of the most recent
Exchange rate schedule.12 The SEC has adopted on this regulatory
issue some of the instruments for structuring discretion; but in im-
portant respects, the informal pattern has remained unchanged.
(4) Other Rule Changes
In the three described SEC/NYSE conflicts, although there was much
informal bargaining, final resolution of the issue was made public.
Much day-to-day regulation of the Exchange, however, is completely
private. The Exchange is required to give the SEC three weeks notice
before any Exchange-initiated rule change becomes effective.'-' In most
instances, neither the Exchange nor the SEC announce submission of
such rule changes. The SEC may object in part, or in whole, to the
proposed change. It is often possible for the SEC and Exchange to
bargain out resolution of disagreement; such bargaining may be over
the telephone, and no written record will be made. No one but agency
officials may know what considerations went into the finally agreed-
upon rule change.130 Many such rule changes may be technical and of
negotiated rates. Although also not mentioning 19(b), the letter does call for a change in
existing Exchange practices. If the April deadline had not been complied with, it would
seem possible for the SEC to consider the letter as a 19(b) order. Thus, after "oppor-
tunity for hearings," the SEC could formulate "rules and regulations to alter or supple-
ment the rules of such exchange." Of course, extensive hearings on the commiLion
structure have already been held, but 19(b) is procedurally structured for hearings after
the Exchange has refused compliance with an SEC request. See Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1964). The SEC did not consider the April letter a
19(b) order, but private litigants could challenge that interpretation.
128. The SEC letter of Oct. 22, 1970 on the Exchange's July rate proposal contains no
discussion of the policy issues involved in approving a "reasonable" rate proposal. CuRmnzr
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. t 77,919 (1970).
129. Securities Exchange Act Releases Nos. 7218 (Jan. 9, 1964) and 7253 (March 3,
(1964). Since 1962 the Exchange had been following a policy of dismusing rule changes
with the SEC staff before submission of them to the Board of Covernors, instead of doing
so only occasionally as it had done previously. 5 L. Loss, SEcURTrrES REGuLATiox 3151 (Supp.
1969). Although the Exchange did not challenge in 1964 promulgation of Rule 17a.8
requiring three weeks notice, it reserved the right to challenge it at a later time, becaum
it caimed the SEC had no power directly to approve or disapprove of an Exchange rule
change.
130. SEcuRrriEs AND Ex CINGE ConsssoN, 35T ANNUAL RnEorr 70-71 (1969) mentions
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little consequence; but the decision whether or not to open considera-
tion of these changes to the public is completely discretionary with the
SEC.
II. The Issue of Informality
A. Pros and Cons
Description of the SEC/NYSE relationship emphasizes three dangers
of informal regulation: 131
(1) Lack of openness to public scrutiny is most significant at the SEC
during the period before decisions are made. If an agency gives public
notice of an issue with which it is concerned or holds public hearings
before it makes its decision, interested parties can provide information
and viewpoints with which they feel the agency may not be acquainted.
The SEC practice of announcing decisions already bargained out with
the Exchange, subject to comments interested parties file, may elicit
additional information; but the weight given these comments will be
of lesser value when agency and Exchange have already become com-
mitted to a decision. In addition, because the Exchange is often not
required publicly to announce its position, the public is deprived of
the major information and viewpoints on which the Commission bases
decisions.
Current bargaining ignores the wide diversity of the securities indus-
try. Although the New York Exchange may be the most important
securities market, its members are not the only persons interested in,
and financially affected by, SEC decisions on Exchange practices.13 2
New York members are not always in complete agreement with
Exchange policies.133 Dissident New York members, regional ex-
changes, over-the-counter and third market dealers are excluded from
the contact with the regulatory process which the Exchange enjoys.
Beyond industry interests, the SEC is mandated to consider the public
96 exchange-initiated rule changes submitted to the SEC, but describes only a few of
them and discusses only one.
131. These three dangers are related specifically to Davis' instruments for structuring
discretion at p. 839 infra. Davis writes of unstructured discretion: "I think the
greatest and most frequent injustice occurs at the discretion end of the scale, where rules
and principles provide little or no guidance, where emotions of deciding officers may ffect
what they do, where the imperfections of human nature are often reflected in the choices
made." K. DAVIS, supra note 10, at v.
132. Ralph Saul, President of the American Exchange and former SEC staff member,
has recently called for "new organizations or arrangements" for regulating the securities
industry, because, for one basic reason, "major elements" of the industry are not now
sufficiently represented. Wall St. Journal, Nov. 16, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
133. See pp. 821, 827-29 supra.
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interest. The investing public may often have a different perspective
from the Exchange. Although there is no designated representative of
the public, except to the extent that is the role assumed by the SEC
itself, various organizations represent investors, and their spokesmen
have appeared at hearings."' If an issue is significant and access to the
Commission is available, more spokesmen may appear.
(2) Lack of policy articulation is possible with the informal bargain-
ing process because the agency does not write an opinion based on a
public record. Opinions, if they are to be given credence, must take into
account opposing viewpoints and conflicting information in the record.
Flaws in the rationale of a decision often become apparent only when it
is put in writing. Without opinions based on a record, SEC officials are
free to fashion decisions solely on personal principles and motivations;
consistency can easily be avoided. Congress and the courts obviously
depend on articulation of policy to scrutinize agency use of its discretion
and faithfulness to legislative intent. Although agency actions can be
observed without articulated policy, written opinions clarify and call
attention to issues, a significant factor in an informal bargaining en-
vironment with a lack of openness.
(3) Dependence on the policy views and personalities of an agency's
officers is a factor in all administrative decision-making, but it is
exacerbated by informal bargaining. No matter how knowledgeable
and public-spirited the SEC is, close relationships which develop be-
tween Commission and Exchange officials inevitably limit the agency's
perspective. 135 The essence of the bargaining process is compromise;
1S4. Hans Reinisch, founder of the National Shareholders Association, testified at the
summer 1970 Securities Investor Protection Hearings on H.R. 13308, H.R. 17585, H.R.
18081, H-R. 18109, and H-R. 18458 Before the Subcomin. on Commerce and Finance o
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 239-52 (1970).
135. As is typical with all the Washington regulatory agencies, the SEC deals daily
with industry officials who are former SEC staff members and commissioners. American
Exchange President Ralph Saul led the 10-man SEC committee investigating the Amex
after its early 1960's scandals. Businessmen in the News: Ralph Saul of the American
Exchange, 74 FORTUNE, Oct. 1966, at 47. In private practice in W ashington are former SEC
chairmen Manuel Cohen and Edward Gadsby and Exchange Act co-author Thomas
Corcoran. Zalaznick, The Small World of Big Washington Lawyers, 80 FoRu NE, Sept.
1969, at 121. Within months after leaving the SEC, Cohen was seeking exemption from
SEC requirements for a new computerized securities s)slem. Loomis, Thtey're Tearing Up
Wall Street, 80 FORTUNE, Aug. 1969, at 88. The Exchange's first offer of its presidency
after Funston's retirement went to former SEC Chairman Donald CooL When he
declined, SEC Chairman Cohen's golfing partner, Robert Haack, mras chosen. Loomis.
Big Board, Big Volume, Big Trouble, 77 FORTUNE, May 1968, at 146, 148.49.
The quality of SEC officials has been very significant in determining agency policy. 'When
the SEC has not been an aggressive regulator, it has been possible to place blame on the
character of the officials holding the reins. Explanation of the pause in the drive to
implement Special Study suggestions during 1965 was attributed largely to the absence of
one man, the aggressive Chairman Cohen, for four months because of illness. N.Y. Times.
Jan. 17, 1966, at 107, col. 1. Blame for the allegedly "near-paralyzed" state of the agency in
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men constantly involved in that process begin to share viewpoints with
those on the other side of the table,8 6 and they are almost always
Exchange officials. The opportunity for trade-offs between Commission
and Exchange can easily submerge the public interest in bargaining
considerations.
These three dangers combine to place vast discretion in the SEC.
Guided only by principles such as "just and adequate to insure fair
dealing" and "for the protection of investors,"137 the SEC has broad,
undefined statutory goals, susceptible to a wide range of interpretation.
The SEC was granted broad discretion in 1934 because Congress felt
itself too unknowledgeable about exchange practices to give more
guidance. 138 Attention then was focused on gross abuses of trading
privileges and large-scale manipulations of stock prices.130 Congress
wanted such practices ended, but it left to the SEC development of
expertise to determine the best methods for achieving these goals. 140
Lack of legislative guidelines is of even greater significance in relation
to a wide spectrum of current regulatory questions which were not even
considered by Congress in 1934. Major policy questions on the com-
spring, 1970 was placed on the lack of dynamism of Chairman Budge. As one former staff
member was quoted, "The commission with all its powers, has limited power. It takes
dynamic leadership to make the commission important in the securities markets, Budge
hasn't provided that leadership." N.Y. Times, June 1, 1970, at 54, col. 1. On the other hand,
the SEC's early success just after passage of the Exchange Act has been attributed to
"some of the most phenomenal talent that the New Deal ever crowded into any regulatory
agency." DEB.DTS, supra note 3, at vii.
136. Former SEC Chairman Cary outlines the four types of influences on SEC officials
which may lead to overly favorable attitudes toward the industry: (1) many commissioners
are, at least when appointed, captives of the industry; (2) "hardening of the arteries-
lack of initiative in fostering new programs;" (3) "the fact that the parties are dealing
with the industry day to day and begin to appreciate their problems without taking due
account of the public interest;" and (4) "an actual lack of personal independence on the
part of commissioners." W. CARY, supra note 20, at 67.
S. ROBBINS, supra note 89, at 122, stresses two other determinants of the regulators'
attitudes: "Association with the field may lead SEC commissioners to develop a confidence
in its activities and friendliness towards its participants that make difficult the firmness
sometimes demanded of an overseer."
Cary backhandedly notes the limitation on the SEC caused by the close relationship with
the industry in discussing the desirability of having the Special Study done by men from
outside the SEC: "It was better that if a firm and hardened position were to be taken, It
be taken by an outside group, for otherwise it would be impossible to deal with the
industry." W. CARY, supra, at 76.
137. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1964).
138. See testimony of J. M. Landis, at that time commissioner of the FTC and a drafter
of the Exchange Act, Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 20, at 20-23.
189. Thomas G. Corcoran, one of the drafters of the Exchange Act, listed the five
problems the act was concerned with: (1) credit control; (2) market manipulation; (3) pro-
tecting outsiders from insiders, (4) ending speculative abuses; and (5) deciding what agency
should do the regulating; in his testimony at the Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 20,
at 85-86.
140. In at least two instances the original draft of the Exchange Act called for specific
guidelines for regulations, which were dropped from the final Act to give the SEC dis.
cretion to fashion remedies. See p. 819 and note 66 supra.
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petitive structure of the securities industry have been intrinsic to
Commission decisions during the past ten years,' 4 ' but a search of the
legislative history offers no guidance to Congressional intent in these
areas.14 Procedural formalities are of special significance with such
broad substantive guidelines. The SEC has the responsibility of filling
in the broad goals with more specific policies. It is thus important that
it be open to the views of all interested parties, and that it articulate
the more specific policies which form its regulatory decisions. In the
absence of the procedural formalities, the agency is susceptible to
myopia and to arbitrariness, because it is free not only from the check
of statutory guidelines, but also the checks of exposure to other inter-
ested parties and of the necessity of publicly articulating what it is
attempting to accomplish.
Criticism of the informal regulatory pattern, though, must take note
of its potential for expeditiously resolving regulatory issues. Four
advantages of the informal process-speed, mutual confidence, inex-
pensiveness and flexible power-deserve scrutiny.
(I) Informal regulation can be rapid. Many SEC suggestions for
rule changes can be handled in several days. Delay would be inevitable
with solicitation of public comments or hearings. Six years plus of
wrangling over commission rate reform raises doubts on the desirability
of opening regulatory issues to the public. Hearings use up much SEC
time, and with the small size of the SEC staff overseeing Exchange
practices, use of more formal procedures might immobilize aggressive
regulation.143
Necessity for rapid regulatory actions, however, should not be given
undue emphasis. If changes are minor, great disapproval from outside
parties is unlikely; solicitation of written comments alone, without
public hearings, should suffice to serve notice-giving and information-
gathering functions. If changes are more important, it is undesirable
141. Major policy questions which the SEC has avoided answering, but which have
been intrinsic to decision-making in recent years, include: What are "reasonable" rates of
commission? Should large institutional investors subsidize small investors as they have
been doing under the fixed commission rate structure? What number of finns in the
investment industry is optimal? Is it necessary that the industry have a strong central
securities market place, as the New York Stock Exchange has been? What is the role of
regional exchanges?
142. Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22
STAN. L. Rxv. 675, 684-85 (1970) finds, "one fact that emerges clearly from the two securities
statutes and their history is that the attention of Congress in 1934 was focused on problems
of dishonesty, manipulation, and solvency, and that no coherent congressional purpose was
articulated concerning the problems of intra-industry competitive structure."
143. The SPEciAL STUDY, supra note 8, pt. 4, at 719-20, notes the inadequate size of the
staff at the Division of Trading and Markets overseeing exchange self-regulation. Only
about ten attorneys are involved in oversight of all securities exchanges.
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that they be approved without benefit of views other than the Ex-
change's.144 In some regulatory activity, speed may be important in
meeting emergency conditions; 45 but in reforming general Exchange
practices, some of which the SEC left unchallenged for years,140 speed is
not of such value. Should it become necessary, provision for temporary
approval, subject to further examination with the help of outside
comments, could be granted by the Commission. 147
(2) The confidence engendered in the informal bargaining process
encourages candor in discussion and generous sharing of information
during behind-the-scenes negotiations. The Exchange can be frank
about failings of its self-regulatory mechanism without fear of public
indignation or repercussions on the stock market. The SEC is aided in
144. See note 156 infra.
145. Speed is important for suspension of the trading in a particular stock to prevent
further price dislocations under Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(a)(1), 15 US.C,
§ 78s (a)(4) (1964); see Comment, Summary and Successive Suspension of Trading Under
the Exchange Act of 1934, 18 CAmT. U. L. REv. 57 (1968).
146. See p. 820 and note 66 supra.
147. If the SEC initiates consideration of reform in Exchange rules or practices, there
is no need for temporary orders. As in the floor trading dispute, the SEC could have,
although it did not, presented its preliminary views and asked for comments before it
reached a conclusion and requested the Exchange to amend its rules. The Exchange would
be expected to make its views known publicly, just as other interested parties would. If the
Exchange did not wish to comply with the first SEC request, made after the Commission
had digested all views presented, then the hearings and order provisions of 19(b) could
be used.
However, if the Exchange rule modification is initiated by the Big Board, as many
changes have been, the procedures set up by 19(b) are not so amenable to public
participation. The Maloney Act calls for SEC approval of all rule changes made by over-
the-counter associations, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 15A(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78o.3(0)
(1964); but there is no such requirement for exchange oversight. Section 19(b) does not
require SEC approval of Exchange rule amendments. However, this Note has (iscussed
SEC approval of Exchange-initiated rule changes as if that were the case, because the
informal pattern has developed a procedure by which the SEC contacts the Exchange aftet
it receives the three week notice of rule changes required under Rule 17a.8, see note 129
supra. By thus contacting the Exchange, the SEC either gives its unofficial approval or
disapproval, in part or in whole, of the change. Either way, the Exchange and Commisgiou
privately bargain out their differences, although in cases of major rule changes such as
the Exchange commission rate proposals, the issue may become public.
It has been suggested that 19(b) should be amended to parallel the Maloney Act's
section 15A(i), thus requiring SEC approval of all Exchange rule changes. lennings,
Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchanga
Commission, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROa. 663, 689 (1964). But such amendment would be
unnecessary for implementation of the public notice suggestion made here. Although the
SEC need not pass judgment on proposed Exchange-initiated rule changes, as toon as
the change is made, 19(b) allows the Commission to "alter or supplement" the rule, Tile
SEC could follow a standard procedure of asking comments on all Exchange.initiated rule
changes. If the SEC itself, or the SEC as influenced by the comments received, feels the
Exchange rule change is undesirable or inadequate, it could then start the 19(b) machinery,
after the rule change has been implemented. This procedure would be cumbersome. It
would be simplified were the SEC required to approve all Exchange rule changes in the
first place. But, barring legislative amendment in the near future, the SEC could still
provide for the public notice function within the present statute. Any cumbersomeness
caused by Exchange implementation of a rule change closely followed by an SEC call for
further change is outweighed by the desirability of ending the private, secret negotiations
which now constitute SEC approval of Exchange-initiated changes,
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developing expertise and matching the Exchange in its familiarity with
the issues.
The advantages of mutual confidence, however, are not as significant
as at first glance. Should confidence break down, the SEC can subpoena
information if it must.148 There may be useful unwritten accounts of
dealings at the Exchange about which the SEC would not be apprised
routinely under a more formalized regulatory pattern;14 9 but to the
extent the Exchange now keeps the SEC informed to create an atmo-
sphere in Washington favorable to Exchange practices, information
will continue to be supplied. If the SEC is now privy to information
embarrassing to the Exchange, cover-ups are not in the public interest.
The SEC was not set up to be, and should not be, a shield for Exchange
practices. Repercussions on the stock market should not be severe
unless the Exchange is seriously neglecting its self-regulatory duties. An
open, public SEC/NYSE relationship itself should act as a means of
allaying some of the fears which cause repercussions because of investor
suspicions that the Exchange "private club" mentality is not reduced
when the SEC and Exchange privately bargain compromises.
(3) Both the speed and mutual confidence advantages assume limita-
tions on SEC staff time. Public notice, hearings and use of subpoenas
might burden the SEC staff and increase the cost of SEC operations. But
staff limitations should not be an excuse for not demanding the appro-
priations needed for proper surveillance of the Exchange. Generous
appropriations for the Special Study indicate measures Congress has
taken when a need has been shown.10
(4) Under the present regulatory pattern, the SEC wields great
flexible power, which might be hampered by procedural requirements.
The Exchange wishes to keep the existing bargaining modus operandi;
thus by threatening formal section 11 or 19(b) proceedings or public
hearings, the SEC has strong leverage tools, which it has used.'5' If
formal proceedings are always held, the bargaining threat is removed.
The Commission is now free to choose issues it feels are most important,
and compromise on other issues with the Exchange, to achieve what it
148. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1964).
149. An example of "inside" Exchange dealings, knowledge of which is helpful to SEC
administrators, is the operation of the Crisis Committee of the Exchange set up within the
past year to stave off bankruptcy of major brokerage finns. N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971, § 3,
at 1, col. 2.
150. Congress appropriated almost $1 million for the Special Study, allowing the SEC
to recruit an extra staff of 65 persons to investigate the industry. SPrrcM. STUDY, S upra
note 8, pt. 1, at 1 n.1, 7.
151. See pp. 819-30 supra.
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considers the most important regulatory goals.'5 2 The Commission can
begin discussion of an issue with the Exchange, and, should reform
prove fruitless or unwise, abandon the campaign without raising cries
of "sell out."
Existence of flexible power, however, is an advantage of informal
bargaining only to the extent such power would be lost with more
formalized proceedings. SEC hearings on commission rates prompted
the Exchange to reform without a public fight despite the reality that
no matter what it did hearings would be held.5 3 Section 11 and 19(b)
authority need be no less fearsome in their formal use than in their
threatened use. Formalizing procedures could lead to a more adversarial
regulatory environment; having lost the advantages of informality, the
Exchange may, rather than compromising at an early stage, challenge
the SEC openly and fight to the end, including resort to judicial review.
But, if the SEC is already doing a conscientious, effective job, judicial
reversals of decisions should be unlikely; the SEC's flexible power
should not be impaired. If the SEC is presently regulating to the
detriment of the investing public, it is undesirable that there not be
judicial disapproval.
Flexible use of SEC authority also may be detrimental to statutory
goals. Use of compromises and of sham issues to push reform raises the
specter of the Commission not seeking the best solution to each regula-
tory issue. The SEC was given wide authority not to make improper
compromise possible, but to provide oversight of many Exchange
activities.
B. Recommendations
The informal bargaining process is an inadequate means of regulat-
ing today's securities industry. The advantages claimed are less persua-
sive than the dangers inherent in continuation of the informal
bargaining pattern, especially when the SEC must now not only
eliminate unfair practices on the New York Exchange as originally
mandated in 1934, but also consider broad policy questions on the
competitive structure of the securities industry in a time of flux.154
152. In the summer of 1963, a year before promulation of Rule lla-1 on floor trading,
the Exchange was expected to give in to SEC suggestions on floor trading reform in order
to strengthen its stand resisting alteration of rules governing specialists and odd lot
dealers. N.Y. Times, March 22, 1964, § 3, at 1, Col. 5.
153. See p. 829 supra.
154. See, e.g., Other People's Money, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1971, at 9; The Market:
Time for a New Broom, NmvswEEK, Nov. 00, 1970, at 71. Unhappiness with the state of
the securities markets and their regulation has led to calls for congressional hearings In
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Formalization of procedures in three ways to improve the regulatory
pattern follows from the foregoing discussion: (1) the SEC should give
notice to and solicit comment from the public on any issue of Exchange
regulation under consideration before determination of a solution; 1rJ3
(2) public hearings should be held on issues of major importance or
over which there is much controversy; 1'0 (3) the SEC should write an
opinion articulating its findings and reasons in connection with any
Exchange reforms it approves. Implementation of these three sugges-
tions would greatly improve the SEC's structuring of its discretion in
terms of Professor Davis' seven criteria. Giving notice and holding
hearings is essential to fair non-judicial procedures which give a voice
to all interested parties. These procedures make possible the compila-
tion of a record from which the SEC can derive open findings. Open
findings will be evidenced in the written opinion of the Commission
along with an open statement of policy, rules, reasons and precedents.
If the SEC does not voluntarily formalize its regulatory pattern,
judicial challenges to its involvement in Exchange activities are likely.
Courts will face two major questions in scrutinizing SEC actions: (1)
Is there jurisdiction to review informal agency actions? and (2) Was
SEC procedure adequate? The questions were faced in the context of an
SEC 19(b) action for the first time in the recent case of Independent
Broker-Dealers' Trade Association v. SEC.157 The D.C. Circuit had
opened up judicial scrutiny of informal agency actions last year by
declaring, "we see no substantial reason why the absence of formal
adjudicatory hearings in the regulatory scheme should render Commis-
sion decisions, however capricious or erroneous, utterly immune to
direct judicial review or redress."'1 8 This principle was applied in
both the House, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 5, and Senate, N.Y. Times, March 9,
1971, at 47, col. 6.
155. See note 147 supra for a discussion of the workings of the recommendation under
19(b).
156. Distinguishing between agency actions which require only notice and written
comments and those which require public hearings could best be handled by announced
SEC guidelines. Clearly the commission rate structure issue is important enough to re-
quire hearings, and technical changes in Exchange rules approved by the SEC could
suffidently be handled through written comments; drawing a line within those two
extremes is difficult. Considerations which should be involved in the line.draving include
whether the change affects parties other than Exchange members, whether it involves
sanctioning of anticompetitive Exchange activities, and the breadth and depth of the
concern of other parties with the change. Most significant is the need for openly announced
Commission guidelines for the agency's discretionary decision on whether or not to hold
hearings. See K. DAvis, supra note 10, at 54-57.
157. 59 U.S.L.W. 2506 (D.C. Cir. March 4, 1971).
158. Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970). cert.
granted, 59 US.LAV. 3413 (U.S. March 22, 1971). The court found In the Exchange Act,
SEC regulations and case precedents authority to review the SEC's decision not to object
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Independent Broker-Dealers in the court's review of SEC involvement
in the Exchange's abolition of give-ups in 1968.1"0 The court recognized
that SEC threats of 19(b) action to push Exchange reform are often
effective without the necessity for 19(b)'s "opportunity for notice and
hearing."160 Thus if the Exchange complies voluntarily with a SEC
suggestion, there may be no notice or hearings to other interested
parties. The court relied in finding jurisdiction to review not on the
mention of 19(b) authority in SEC letters to the Exchange, but on SEC
pressure on the Exchange which "amounts to more than a mere invita-
tion to voluntary compliance, and carries ...an element of undue
influence and sufficient dangers of intrusion into matters beyond the
scope of the Commission's power."1 1 The court realized that although
procedures were informal, their effects in changing Exchange practices
were the same as if formal proceedings with notice and hearings had
been held. The Commission's action became final when the Exchange
accepted the suggestion to end give-ups. Other interested parties had
no adequate remedy except judicial review. 02 Thus, whenever the SEC
is closely involved with an Exchange rule modification, as it was in all
three SEC/NYSE disputes described here, the court will be able to find
jurisdiction to review the Commission's actions.
In reviewing the adequacy of the procedures by which the SEC
pushed the Exchange to abolish give-ups, the court demanded "ele-
mentary fairness" including "reasonable opportunity.., for submission
of views by those materially affected."'0 3 Once the court had equated
if Dow Chemical Co. did not include the Medical Committee's proposal in Its proxy
statement, although the Commission's action was made completely through Informal
communication between Dow, the Medical Committee and itself.
159. Independent Broker-Dealers' Association v. SEC, 39 U.S.L.W. 2506 (D.C. Cir.
March 4, 1971). See discussion of this regulatory move at pp. 827-829 supra.
160. See the discussion of the use of 19(b) as a threat to accomplish Exchange com-
pliance at pp. 825-26 supra.
161. Independent Broker-Dealer's Association v. SEC, Civil No. 22,252 (D.C. Cir. March
4, 1971), at 17. The court relies on the Administrative Procedure Act § 10(b), 5 11SC.
§ 704 (1964), making reviewable "final agency action for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court." It notes the danger, as emphasized in Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), that government actions will be concealed as purely private Exchange actions In
order to preclude judicial review. Independent Broker-Dealers Association, .supra at 16.17.
The court notes, "The possibility that the Exchange might have taken the same action on
its own provides no basis for declining jurisdiction over pressures by the Commission
that may wrongfully influence and intrude on its decision-making," supra at 19.
162. In 1954 the securities industry was very concerned that 19(b) actions be open tojudicial review. At the time the SEC calmed the industry by stating that there was no need
for all 19(b) actions to be made by formal orders in order to be reviewable in light of
Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 416 (1942) and Philadelphia
Co. v. SEC, 164 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir. 1947), cert. denied 333 U.S. 828, See 2 L. Loss, ScunirTs
RrGULATiON 1183 (2d ed. 1965).
163. Independent Broker-Dealers' Association v. SEC, Civil No. 22,252 (D.C. Cir,
March 4, 1971), at 21.
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the substantive effects of informal pressure on the Exchange with what
would occur had the SEC used more formal proceedings to cause Ex-
change rules to be changed, it followed logically that elementary fair-
ness to other parties affected by the Exchange rule change be required.
On the give-up issue, the SEC had made public long in advance of its
approval of the Exchange's abolition of them its concern with the issue;
public comment had been solicited; hearings had been held.16 Thus
the court had little difficulty finding the Independent Broker-Dealers
had an opportunity to express their views to the agency.10 5
The court, however, did not require the SEC to articulate policy and
findings on the give-up issue: "the Commission need not make an ulti-
mate finding in order to lodge a preliminary request with the Exchange,
even if the request is accompanied by certain pressures toward com-
pliance."' u 6 The court allowed give-ups to be abolished at SEC urging
"even though there has been no agency finding as to its advisability."'0
In not demanding articulation, the court departed from its realization
that the effects of informal pressures are the same as those of formal
proceedings in causing substantive reform. It would seem logically to
follow that if an agency must rationalize its decisions after formal
proceedings, it should also rationalize its findings and policies when
through informal actions it causes the same substantive changes. The
failure of the court to extend its realization of the equivalency between
informal and formal procedures, on which it predicated its findings of
jurisdiction to review and need for elementary fairness, to a demand for
articulation of policy provides inadequate judicial review. Notice and
hearings are of little value to aggrieved parties if the agency is allowed
to ignore the information presented. Articulation of findings and
policies is a procedure which forces agency attention to these opposing
views.168
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Independent Broker-Dealers marks a
beginning of judicial recognition of the broad authority wielded by the
SEC through informal procedures.10 9 The court has recognized some
164. See pp. 827-31 supra.
165. Independent Broker-Dealers' Association v. SEC, Civil No. 22,252 (D.C. Cir.
March 4, 1971), at 22-23.
166. Id. at 24.
167. Id.
168. In Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F-0d 659, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. granted, 59 U.S.LW. 3413 (U.S. March 22, 1971), after finding jurisdiction to review
the informal proxy actions of the Commission, the court specifically remanded for
articulation of the Commission's policy and findings, "so that the basis for [its] decision[may] appear clearly on the record, not in conclusory terms but in sulfficent detail to
permit prompt and effective review."
169. Review of the Exchange's abolition of give-ups at the urging of the SEC provided
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structuring of the broad discretion involved in this regulatory pattern
is necessary. The task now is to devise a broad, flexible framework,
perhaps similar to Professor Davis' seven instruments, which can be
used to evaluate appropriateness of agency procedures and to require
agencies to give notice, hold hearings and articulate policies when
failure to follow these procedures will deprive interested parties of
elementary fairness. The evidence presented in this Note substantiates
the argument that the requirement of some procedural formalities at
the SEC in its regulation of the New York Stock Exchange will alleviate
some of the disadvantages of the current informal bargaining process
without seriously impairing the SEC's role as an effective regulator.
III. Conclusion
Although the procedural recommendations should reduce the dan-
gers of lack of openness, lack of policy articulation and over-dependence
on the particular personalities of SEC officials, their limited effective.
ness should also be recognized. Openness gives interested parties the op-
portunity to be heard, but there is no guarantee the Commission will pay
attention. Written opinions based on a public record force some atten-
tion to conflicting data, but the necessity for the agency may become
the writing of competent opinions which account for the data and still
achieve the result that would have been achieved without it,171 Simi.
larly, articulation of policy can become but a requirement of well-
written opinions which cleverly articulate the policy necessary to justify
a result.1'71 Over-dependence on particular SEC personnel will not be
a major break-through for finding judisdiction to review SEC informal actions; but the
court was not pressed to confront the more informal bargaining process which has
characterized SEC actions on reforms other than the commission rate structure, See
pp. 825-30 supra. By holding public hearings and soliciting outside comments, the SEC
had deviated from its more usual bargaining pattern on this issue.
An argument that the decision in Independent Broker Dealers expands the scope of
civil liability of Exchange member firms for violations of Exchange rules is made in N.
Wolfson and T. Russo, The Stock Exchange Member: Liability for Violation of Stock
Exchange Rules, 58 CALiF. L. Rv. 1120 (1970). If Exchange rules are to be given this
expanded impact, the need for public scrutiny of the SEC process of approval of the rules
is of even greater significance than in the past.
170. Although admitting that getting all the information on the table Is a useful first
step, Marx, Administrative Regulation in Comparative Perspective, 26 LAw fa CONTEMz,.
PRoB. 307, 221 (1961) emphasizes the substantive reality behind the procedural formality:
"Notices of intent and provision for hearing are auxiliary to arriving at a finding. It is
the finding that is indispensable."
171. The January, 1970. Exchange rate proposal was based on a cost analysis of
member firms. If the Commission decided to base a reasonableness standard upon such
data, articulation of policy would seem simplified and unsusceptible to manipulation, but
as an "economist points out . .. costs are just as susceptible to tilting as rates and ... the
Exchange's analysis presents numerous opportunities -for adroit data massaging. Various
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limited if the personnel are intelligent administrators capable of using
data advanced to mold the policy articulated to the result desired. Sub-
stantive improvements in SEC regulation need not necessarily follow
from procedural advances.
The limited usefulness of procedural devices to improve SEC regula-
tion makes it desirable that substantive SEC policies also receive
scrutiny. When the Exchange Act was approved 37 years ago, Congress
was ignorant about many Exchange practices and it did not consider the
problems of the competitive structure of the securities industry. The
Exchange Act contains only the broadest substantive guidelines for
SEC promotion of open and honest markets and no guidelines for SEC
participation in the structuring of competition in the industry.- 2 The
securities industry is presently operating in the wake of major distur-
bances of and challenges to Exchange practices. The "scandal syn-
drome" has once again become effectual, in part because of Exchange
volume fluctuations and consequent paperwork and capital problems,'713
but more significantly because communication and automation ad-
vances have placed in doubt the necessity of continued protection of
the New York Stock Exchange as the nation's strong central securities
marketplace.7 4 It is appropriate that Congress re-examine the desirabil-
ity of grants of vast discretion to the SEC with few or no legislative guide-
lines. Congressional review would be especially helpful in guiding dis-
cretion in the conflict between the SEC's sanctioning of Exchange
anticompetitive practices and the policies underlying the Sherman Act.
Congressional consideration of conflicts between SEC policies and the
antitrust acts should concentrate in part on the appropriateness of
.public interest' objectives could be mixed in." Welles, Can the New York Stock Exchange
Survive? IN strn-ONAL INvEsroR, June 1970, at 25, 75-76. The possibilities for data manipu-
lation increased when the Exchange departed from a cost.based rate structure in its
June 1970 proposal.
172. See pp. 834-35 supra.
173. See, e.g., Note, The Back Office and the Antitrust Laws, 69 COL. . RM. 299
(1969); Securities Investor Protection Hearings on H.R. 13308, H.RL 17585, H.R. 1801,
H.R. 18109 and H.R. 18458 Before the Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
174. An argument which has slowly been gaining support over the past five years,
that automation is making the Big Board obsolete, is best summed up in the title of the
article, Welles, Can the New York Stock Exchange Survive? INSTITuTIONAL LvEron, June
1970, at 25. Surveying the increasing disenchantment of institutional investors with the
Exchange and the vast new possibilities for automation of the entire exchange mechanism,
Welles asks of the Exchange, "do we need it?" Supra at 26. An automated s)stem, which
could supplant the New York Exchange as the central market place for all securities, has
been set up by the National Association of Securities Dealers within the past year. See
Morgello, One Big Push-Button Market for All? NwswEE, Nov. 80, 1970, at 74-75. Such
a centralized system, which would take over all securities trading, is being seriously con-
sidered by William McChesney Martin, who was commissioned by the New York Stock
Exchange to survey its operations. Wall St. Journal, April 30, 1971, at 1, col 6.
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resolution of legislative conflicts by an administrative agency. Much
antitrust policy is grounded in a mistrust of private interests combining
to restrain trade. The informal bargaining pattern, because of its lack
of openness to public scrutiny, presents some of the same dangers of
substantial, unchecked power as do private combinations. Should the
SEC adopt the procedural recommendations suggested here, the regula-
tory pattern would be better adapted for fairly making decisions in this
area; but even with such formalities, Congress needs to face directly
the question of whether the SEC is an appropriate institution for mak-
ing such decisions.
Justice Douglas' shotgun-behind-the-door, rusty from disuse in the
1950's was brought out by an aggressive SEC during much of the 1960's.
It proved a powerful weapon when wielded by sure-shot SEC officials,
but it also demonstrated serious short-comings when used in an in-
formal bargaining pattern where great discretion prevailed. Having
been pulled from behind the door, the shotgun now needs oiling
through formalization of Commission procedures and Congressional
examination of the targets at which it should be aimed. Formalization
is the best weapon for continuing to pursue the goals of the Securities
and Exchange Act of 1934 as the nation's securities markets face the
problems of the 1970's.
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